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Abstract 
The objective of the Traditional HAZOP study is (with collaboration of multidisciplinary team of employees of 
contractor) to identify potential hazards operability issues in process (Hazard and Operability Analysis) and to 
propose preventing actions. But there can be used also quantitative HAZOP study, which is able to estimate the risks 
in accordance to multi-factor Risk Assessment. The qualitative HAZOP analysis technique uses a systematic 
approach to identify possible deviations from normal operations and ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place to 
help prevent accidents with keywords for generating deviations from safe condition. Quantitative HAZOP is based on 
development of scenarios and finding the causes deviations, to identify safety functions and estimate the final effects, 
but it more complements the assessment of severity and probability of each scenario - it allows selecting the most 
important preventive recommendations for implementation. 
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1. HAZOP study 
1.1. Introduction 
Basics of the method HAZOP originated from the need to identify hazards of handling of hazardous 
substances in the chemical industry. The aim of the method is to identify hazards and with the proposed 
measures to minimize or completely eliminate potential sources of risk. 
After more than 30 years of using HAZOP method [1], this method is widely accepted standard and 
has extended to other industries (now used in a wide range of businesses from pharmaceutical companies, 
through mechanical engineering to electrical engineering). For practical applications, it is clear that if 
HAZOP is used to a complex technology as a whole, the result is a wide range of scenarios. 
Since the implementation of all recommendations of the HAZOP analysis can be very expensive, 
selection of these scenarios with regard to their relevance to safety and operability of technology 
assessment is a logical requirement of the sponsor of HAZOP study. 
Similar effort to supplement HAZOP method with risk assessment occur in some contributions, see 
article [2], which deals with the possibilities of linking approaches HAZOP and FTA or article [3], which 
is aimed at merging method HAZOP with checklists. 
Efficient possibility for selection of important scenarios identified by HAZOP study is adding of 
qualitative risk analysis - as described in this article. 
1.2. HAZOP Study 
HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study) is a systematic safety study, based on the systemic approach 
towards an assessment of safety and operability of complex process equipment, or the production process. 
Table 1. A dictionary of the keywords for a HAZOP study 
Keyword Logical meaning Example 
NO Total negation of the original function No flow 
MORE Quantitative increase Higher flow 
LESS Quantitative decrease Lower flow 
AS WELL AS Qualitative increase (occurrence of another case) Penetration of a water into the reactor 
PART OF Qualitative decrease A compound is missing 
REVERSION Opposite function (activity) Reverse flow of a medium 
OTHER THAN Total substitution Presence of other substances 
EARLY Premature function (activity) - 
LATE Delayed function (activity) - 
BEFORE Relating to order or sequence  
AFTER Relating to order or sequence  
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This systematic method is based on the systemic approach towards the difficult production technology 
or the production procedure. The HAZOP method further uses: 
x Systemic approach towards assessment of safety and operability, 
x Advantage of the keywords (see table 1) for generation of deviations from the safe situation [4], 
x Principle of a brainstorming during the creative development of the considered scenarios of events, 
originating from the deviation from the safe situation, followed by finding of causes of the deviation, 
an identification of the safety functions and a guess of possible effects. 
 
The record of a study is realized by a usual form of the discussion of the HAZOP team according to the 
scheme: 
deviation – causes – effects – safety functions – action / measure. 
 
The objective of the Traditional HAZOP study is (with collaboration of multidisciplinary team of 
employees of contractor) to identify potential hazards operability issues in process (Hazard and 
Operability Analysis) and to propose preventing actions. 
 
1.3. Objectives of HAZOP study 
HAZOP in the process industry may be focused either to the assessment of safety (with a consideration 
of the possible risks for both the used equipment and the operators), or to the operability (with regards to 
keeping of the required quality of the product). 
From the experiences gained from the practical application of HAZOP in process industry is evident 
that the contractor very often required considering of the following factors: 
x Possibility of degradation / decomposition of raw materials, 
x Possibility of a failure of the human factors, 
x Possibility of an exothermic runaway of reaction, decomposition hazard from the raw materials, 
reaction mixture, intermediates and final products, 
x Possibility of an undesirable side reactions, 
x Possibility of a utility failure. 
 
1.4. Advantages and disadvantages of HAZOP 
An advantage of the systematic study of HAZOP methods for the practice: 
x Systematic and thorough examination of the assessed equipment with an aim to identify the dangerous 
statuses (scenarios), 
x Possibility to evaluate of the consequences of a failure of personnel, finding of such situations, where 
the mistake of personnel would have a significant consequences, 
x Finding of new dangerous situations, a systematic procedure allowing to find new dangerous 
situations, that may occur, 
x Increase of the efficiency of the operation equipment, finding of situations, that may lead towards 
disturbing of the operation, unplanned breaks, damage of the equipment, loss of the in-processed raw 
material, but also towards improvement of the operational regulations, 
x Better understanding of the process, even experienced members of the meeting may acknowledge a 
new information regarding the operation of the assessed equipment "I have never previously know as 
much about this operation". 
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A disadvantage of the systematic study of HAZOP methods for the practice: 
x Long time needed (depends on the size of technology), 
x The need to clear definition of objectives / focus and set of HAZOP studies considered the effects – at 
the beginning of the study, without a clear definition of objectives (eg, identification of emergency 
situations) gives boundless studies which do not give clear outputs, 
x High demands on the knowledge and skills of HAZOP study participants, without good HAZOP team 
and HAZOP leader good HAZOP study can’t be done. 
 
2. Human HAZOP 
2.1. Action error analysis 
Due to the frequent request from contractor, to supplementation of HAZOP study with analysis of a 
failure of the human factors, is convenient to add some assessment of single process steps by Action Error 
Analysis. The aim of this procedure is to find possible mistakes of personnel and their potential reasons. 
For the identification of the possible failures of the personnel, the Human HAZOP method can be a 
supplementation of method HAZOP. The important advantage of the Human HAZOP studies consists of 
the fact, that the resulting knowledge gathered during the structured and systematic finding of the 
potential problems connected to the reliability of the human factor is a big assistance for setting of the 
suitable corrective actions. 
Table 2. A dictionary of the keywords for a Human HAZOP study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keyword Logical meaning 
NOT DONE Action was not carried out  
REPEATED Action was carried out more times 
LESS Action was carried out with a lower effect 
MORE Action was carried out with a bigger effect 
EARLIER Action was carried out earlier 
LATER Action was carried out later 
AND ALSO Another action was also carried out 
REVERSED A sequence of actions was breached 
OTHER THAN Different action was carried out 
PART Only a part of action was carried out 
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The actual procedure of a method of Human HAZOP is similar to the case of a basic HAZOP, only 
further keywords are used, that are interpreted from a viewpoint of the human factor (these are listed in 
table 2). 
The identification of possible failures of personnel is an important part of the identification of scenarios 
of the possible accidents. The identification process of human errors must meet the following criteria: 
x It must assure the complexity of identified scenarios, 
x It must allow the elimination, or minimizing of the possible consequences of a failure of personnel. 
 
The failures of operators are divided based on the approach defined in a study [5] to: 
Omissions (Error of Omission) 
x The operator forgets to carry out the task, or a part of it, 
Mistakes (Error of Commission) 
x The operator carries out the task incorrectly, 
x The operator carries out the task, that should not be carried out at all, 
x The operator carries out the task outside the sequence, 
x The operator carries out the task earlier or later than required. 
 
3. Qualitative risk analysis 
Using of qualitative evaluation of all the identified scenarios allows the contractor focus on the most 
important problems of technology assessment, ie. propose appropriate technical / organization 
recommendations to minimize identified risks and plan to implement of the recommendations. 
The extent and type of additional qualitative assessment should be selected by the contactor 
requirements and technology assessment.  
 
3.1. Scale of qualitative risk analysis 
The positives of this approach lay mainly in the ability to evaluate the impact to the organization or the 
employees (including the consequences, which cannot be directly expressed in the financial units). 
Qualitative evaluation of risks is a complex process for determination of severity and probability of an 
occurrence of the undesirable scenario and a decision, which actions will be carried out for the 
elimination, or limitation of the risk to the acceptable level. 
The estimation of the identified extraordinary events should be accomplished by a simple double-
criterion pointed qualitative method. Using this method, the risks R are evaluated in 2 items according to 
the formula: 
R = P x S  (1) 
where P is probability of occurrence and S is severity of consequences. 
 
The assignation of the individual parameters is listed in tables 3, 4 and 5. 
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Table 3. Probability of the occurrence 
P Probability of the occurrence Meaning 
1 < 0.0001 Very low 
2 0.001 – 0.0001 Low 
3 0.01 – 0.001 Middle 
4 0.1 – 0.01 High 
5 > 0.1 Very high 
Table 4. Severity of consequences 
S Loss Harms 
1 < 1000 EUR No injury 
2 1000 - 10 000 EUR Minor injuries 
3 10 000 - 100 000 EUR Serious injuries 
4 100 000 - 1 000 000 EUR 1 deadly injury 
5 > 1 000 000 EUR > 1 deadly injury 
Table 5. Risk importance 
Risk R = P x S 
1 - 3 Non-significant 
3 – 7 Low significant 
8 - 25 Significant 
 
The probability of the occurrence of an event (P) is the parameter, expressing the relative occurrence 
of a failure in the line of opportunities, which originates from reason of an event and a detection of the 
failure situation (safety equipment and devices that alert to the dangerous situation, or automatically 
surpass it). Also the system of control of the working system and the abilities and knowledge of operators 
could be put into consideration. 
Among the important parameters, which could be considered during the analysis, are the reserve 
systems (measurement, control), that allow to continue in the operation in case of a failure situation, a 
measuring and alarm device and the construction equipment, resistant to the failure situation. 
In cases, when it is not possible to use the information about the intensity of failures, this value can be 
found out by an estimation of the HAZOP team. 
The severity of consequences / loss (S) expresses the significance of the consequence of a failure in 
case of a full development of the scenario. During evaluation of the severity, the eventual financial losses 
should be put into the consideration (either on e.g. damaged product – i.e. a failure to observe the 
requirements of the customer, or on the damaged equipment), or harms on the health of the employees. 
The risk (R) is a combination of the probability of occurrence of some undesirable situation (event) 
and a degree of severity of their consequences (severity of damage, losses). 
The acceptability of risks should be determined, to be able to decide about the most important 
scenarios and to prioritize the actions for minimizing of the risk. In case that the risk scenarios are 
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evaluated as significant, the suggested measure must be implemented as soon as possible. In case that the 
risk scenarios are evaluated as of low significance, it is not necessary to implement the measure, in case 
of an occurrence of this scenario the operator should review the analysis and consider an acceptance of 
the measure. 
 
4. Improved HAZOP with qualitative risk analysis 
The HAZOP method with added qualitative risk analysis technique use a systematic approach to 
identify possible deviations from normal operations and ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place to 
help prevent accidents with keywords for generating deviations from safe condition. HAZOP with 
qualitative risk analysis is also based on principle of brainstorming for creative development scenarios 
and finding the causes deviations, to identify safety functions and estimate the final effects, but it more 
complements the assessment of severity and probability of each scenario - it allows selecting the most 
important preventive recommendations for implementation. 
Design modifications of standard tables for recording the HAZOP study for HAZOP with qualitative 
risk analysis is listed in the following table (table 6). 
 
Table 6. Head of the modified of standard tables for recording the HAZOP study 
Key 
word Deviation Causes 
Probability 
(P) Effects 
Safety 
functions 
Severity 
(S) 
Estimated 
Risk (R)  
Preventive 
measure 
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5. Conclusion 
An increasing number of applications of HAZOP for assessing the whole technological units with a 
huge number of scenarios in one HAZOP study the pressure on prioritizing of identified scenarios 
increases. Possibility for prioritizing scenarios is supplementing HAZOP study with qualitative risk 
analysis. 
This approach allows identifying the most important issues of assessed technology and assists to 
design an appropriate technical/organizational measure to minimize of identified risks. 
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